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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
pealable. 6 Moore 2321-2322. However, since the courts do not
always follow this procedure, it would be better practice for
either party to move explicitly for an interlocutory injunction
under 28 1T. S. C. A. 1292(1). Morgenstern Chemical Co. v. Schering Co., 181 F. 2d 160 (3d Cir. 1950). Judge Frank, in the instant
case, indirectly arrives at this result by treating the order as such
a denial since part of the complaint asked for such temporary
relief, but the fundamental difficulty of uncertainty of review remains. The need for reform has been recognized by the Supreme
Court. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U. S. 507
(1950) (particularly Mr. Justice Black's dissent). It is hoped that
the Supreme Court or Congress will make it clear what procedure
should be followed.
Leonard F. Walentynowiez
INCOME TAX - DIVIDENDS IEL) TAXABLE INCOME
IN YEAR OF ACTUAL RECEIPT
Taxpayer, on a cash basis, received dividends on his federal
savings and loan association shares by mail in 1950. They were
declared and payable on December 31, 1949 at which time taxpayer had the right to appear personally at a company office and
demand payment. Held: The dividends were not constructively
received during 1949, but constituted 1950 income. Commissioner
v. Fox, 218 F. 2d 347 (3d Cir. 1954).
INT. REv. CoDE. oF 1939, § 42(a), 53

STAT 47 (now INT. REv.
oF 1954, § 451(a) provides, "The amount of all items of
gross income shall be included in the taxable year in which received by the taxpayer . ...
The Commissioner contended that the
fact that the taxpayer could have gone to a company office and
demanded payment on December 31 made the income taxable in
1949 under the doctrine of constructive receipt. This treats as
taxable income which is unqualifiedly subject to the demand of a
taxpayer on a cash basis, whether or not such income has been
actually received in cash.

CoDE

In Avery v. Commissioner, 292 U. S. 210 (1934), it was held
that when it is the practice of the corporation to pay dividends
by mail, it cannot be said that the dividends are "cash or other
property unqualifiedly subject to the taxpayers demand" until
the checks are actually received by the stockholders. Prior to the
Avery decision, the Commissioner maintained and lower courts
frequently decided that dividends were taxable to taxpayers on a
cash basis in the year in which they were declared and mailed.
See Sohearman v. Commissioner, 66 F. 2d 256 (2d Cir. 1933).

RECENT DECISIONS
As a result of the Avery case the Treasury Department promulgated the rule now found in Treasury Regulations 118, Section
39. 42-3 (1953), which provides that corporate dividends are taxable when unqualifiedly made subject to the demand of the shareholder. Where a corporation in the ordinary course of business
sends out the checks by mail, dividends declared and payable
on December 31 are not subject to the taxpayers demand prior to
January when the checks are actually received.
'Under the doctrine of constructive receipt, the Treasury may
subject income to taxation when the only thing preventing its reduction to possession is the volition of the taxpayer. Ross v. Commissioner, 169 F. 2d 483 (1st Cir. 1948). This doctrine was applied in Frank W. Kunze, 19 T. 0. 29 (1952), aff'd. per curiam,
203 F. 2d 957 (2d Cir. 1953), where the taxpayer, the president
and one of two stockholders in the corporation, deliberately had
his dividend check mailed to him to control the year of receipt.
As it was actually available to him on December 31, it was held
income on that date.
Bond coupons have been held income at the time of actual
maturity despite the fact that the taxpayer was prevented by a
physical disability from actually clipping and cashing them.
Loose v. U. S., 74 F. 2d 147 (8th Cir. 1934). Where a check was
received on December 31 after 5 P. M. it was still regarded as
income in December even though it was not deposited until the
following year. Charles F. Kahler, 18 T. C. 31 (1952). An intent
of the taxpayer to receive income earlier than it is actually due
him may also be controlling in determining the year of actual
receipt. See McEuen v. Commissioner, 196 F. 2d 127 (5th Cir.
1952).
The doctrine of constructive receipt has been rejected where
the taxpayer received the check on December 31 but agreed with
the maker that he would hold it a few days before cashing it, L. M.
Fisher,14 T. C. 792 (1950), and where geographical distance prevented a check mailed on December 28 from reaching the taxpayer until January 2. George E. Rex, 3 T. C. M. 1260 (1944).
The decisions of the Tax Court have followed the principle
set forth in the Avery case where it is clearly the usual practice
of the corporation to pay dividend checks by mail. A. S. Eldridge,
30 B. T. A. 1322 (1934), Edward S. Harkness, 31 B. T. A. 1100
(1935), Anna F. Ardenghi, 37 B. T. A. 345 (1938).
The instant decision takes a practical view of the modern
business practices of dividend-paying associations and reaches a
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just result. The doctrine of constructive receipt should be sparingly applied and used by the Commissioner only in situations
where a taxpayer deviates from the normal course of action to
manipulate the year of receipt.
Richard C. Wagner
JURISDICTION -

SINGLE TRANSACTION HELD TO BE
"DOING BUSINESS"

Defendant foreign corporation sold machinery to plaintiff.
Defendant had taken the order through an independent broker,
recommended the manner of installation and sent a salesman to
investigate performance after installation. Nothing more was
done by defendant within the forum. Held (5-4): Defendant had
done business in the forum and was subject to its jurisdiction in
a breach of warranty suit. S. Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co.,
Okla. __, 277 P. 2d 655 (1954).
-

Prior to InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310
(1945), it was generally held that a single act by a foreign corporation within a state was insufficient to subject it to the in personam jurisdiction of the state. Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis
Brown Co., 260 U. S. 516 (1923); Hunau v. Northern Region Supply Corp., 262 Fed. 181 (S. D. N. Y. 1920). To be subject to jurisdiction it must have engaged in such a continuous and regular
course of business that it was "present" in the state, International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579 (1914); or that its consent to suit could be implied, Commercial Mutual Accident Co. v.
Davis, 213 U. S. 245 (1909). Incidental activities, such as mere
solicitation of business, were not sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 205 U. S. 530 (1907) (railroad
with no tracks in state having an agent soliciting freight and passenger traffic) ; People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246
U. S. 79 (1918) (advertisement of products and agents with no
authority to take orders). However, solicitation by agents whose
orders were accepted outside the state and who had authority to
make collections amounted to "doing business." International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, supra; Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal
Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915 (1917).
The InternationalShoe case discarded the presence and consent theories and substituted a test of reasonableness. Due
process was held to be satisfied where the foreign corporation had
such minimum contacts with the state that the maintenance of
the suit did not offend traditional notions of fair play and sub-

